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\_\_\_\_\_ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Thursday 13 July 1978 \_\_\_\_\_ CG NIDC 78/162C \_\_\_\_\_

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**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
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Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010104-5

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 13 July 1978.

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The NID cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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CONTENTS

25X1

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Controversy Page 5

GHANA: Akuffo Policy Speech Page 6

CHINA-ALBANIA: Economic Aid Page 7

BRIEFS: Page 8

Bolivia

25X1

25X1

25X1

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Controversy

25X1 [ ] Antonio Guzman has been officially certified as president-elect of the Dominican Republic, but he has lost political ground because of the decision last week by the Central Electoral Commission to strip his party of the senate majority it apparently won in the 16 May national election. Guzman will apparently accept the commission's decision, however, rather than risk losing the presidency in an open confrontation with the military.

25X1 [ ] The embattled commission tried to end seven weeks of legal and administrative haggling by compromising between Guzman and the extremist supporters of outgoing President Joaquin Balaguer. The commission certified Guzman's election and his party's control of the lower house, dismissed charges of fraud against his center-left party, and refused to call a new election as Balaguer's Reformist Party had demanded. The commission also, however, transformed what had been a three-seat senate majority for Guzman's party into a four-seat advantage for the Reformists.

25X1 [ ] The commission's decision may have kindled as much controversy as it tried to settle. There has been heavy criticism from the press as well as angry reactions from Guzman's followers.

25X1 [ ] The new lineup in the prestigious senate gives the Reformist Party--and the powerful military factions that influence it--the ability to obstruct Guzman's legislative program and to limit his control over the government bureaucracy. The senate has exclusive authority to appoint members of the judiciary--including the chief justice, who is second in line to succeed the president. The senate also fills key positions on the Central Electoral Commission and on the watchdog Accounting Commission, confirms all diplomatic appointments, and tries impeachment cases against public officials.

25X1 [ ] //Guzman will apparently accept his party's loss of senate seats for the sake of a peaceful transition to the presidency. Although he has introduced a legal challenge before

the Supreme Court, he has strongly rejected proposals for a general strike and other public protests because these might serve as a pretext for military intervention. If Guzman continues to restrain the militant faction of his party, he is almost certain to be inaugurated on 16 August.//

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# GHANA: Akuffo Policy Speech

//In his first policy statement, delivered on Monday, Ghana's new leader General Akuffo emphasized economic reform and continuity in foreign policy. He also promised to restore democratic rule by next July and announced an amnesty for Ghanaian exiles. His speech reflects a sober appreciation of Ghana's serious problems and a determination to start tackling them, but Akuffo's civilian critics are skeptical about his ability to follow through.//

//Akuffo announced several economic measures intended to stop Ghana's economic decline and its inflationary spiral. These include curtailment of government spending, restrictions on imports in order to conserve foreign exchange, and encouragement of production and foreign investment.//

//Akuffo has since requested immediate food aid and expressed hope for financial assistance from the US until Ghana reaches an agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a stabilization and assistance program. Akuffo has also told a US Embassy officer that Ghana will continue to lean toward the West.//

//In his speech, the Ghanaian leader said the public would soon be informed of the military's plans to restore constitutional rule by July 1979 as his predecessor had promised. He had earlier told members of the armed forces that the military would have no role in a future government. Akuffo announced an amnesty for Ghanaian political exiles; political prisoners were released last week.//

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[ ] //Many civilian opponents of military rule will resent Akuffo's failure to speed up the return to democratic government but will welcome his offer of amnesty. Professionals and students in particular regard Ghana's change of leadership as cosmetic and likely to lead to little real change. A popular opposition figure, retired General Afrifa, could thus become a force to be reckoned with if he returns from exile in Togo.//

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[ ] //General Odartey-Wellington, who allegedly represents the junior officers, has become the new Army Commander and the only new council member--fueling speculation that he was the real power behind the coup. The new leadership nevertheless seems relatively united. [ ]

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#### CHINA-ALBANIA: Economic Aid

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[ ] Albania's official radio yesterday confirmed earlier press reports that China will end all economic assistance to the country. Although the Hoxha regime probably anticipated this move, the loss of Chinese aid--which has amounted to some \$600 million to \$800 million since 1961--will inevitably create difficulties for the country's weak economy.

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[ ] Chinese-Albanian relations are now at their lowest point since friction began in the aftermath of President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Recent Albanian support for Vietnam in its dispute with China undoubtedly angered the Chinese, and the Albanians have for some time been sniping at China's foreign policy; they feel that China has become too much involved with the West, and with the US in particular.

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[ ] The Chinese have expressed their irritation by gradually reducing their assistance and bilateral contacts over the past year. Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng, moreover, has conspicuously omitted Tirana from a planned visit to the region next month that includes stops in Yugoslavia and Romania.

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25X1 [ ] It is uncertain how badly the Chinese pullout will set back Albania's industrialization program. Albania's chances of purchasing Western equipment and technology are limited by its inability to expand exports and its strong opposition to accepting foreign credits.

25X1 [ ] The USSR may want to exploit the situation by taking soundings with the Albanians, but the present Albanian leaders are unlikely to improve relations with the Soviet Union because they fear the Soviets would overthrow them. The deterioration of Chinese-Albanian relations will particularly worry the Yugoslavs, who are deeply suspicious of Soviet motives in the Balkans. Yugoslavia is likely to redouble its efforts to improve relations with Albania, particularly in the economic field. [ ]

#### BRIEFS

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#### Bolivia

25X1 [ ] Juan Pereda, the official candidate in Bolivia's presidential election held on Sunday, appears to have captured just under half of the approximately 60 percent of the ballots tallied so far. Outside observers and opposition candidate



Hernan Siles Zuazo have criticized the handling of the election; their charges range from ballot-box stuffing to physical intimidation of voters. The government is unquestionably intervening to affect the outcome, although the extent and nature of official meddling may never be known.

Despite the government's efforts, Pereda may not gain the simple majority of the popular vote needed for election. If he falls short, the outcome will be decided by the new congress, in which government supporters will apparently hold a majority. The regime is probably now focusing its efforts on rigging the legislative election in order to ensure a favorable decision in the event congress has to choose the new president.

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